Draft guideline for data centres  in the Netherlands

  1. Data centres in the Netherlands may not provide services to social media platforms, unless they meet the criteria in this guideline.
  2. A social media platform is defined as a ‘user-to-user service’ in the terms of the UK Online Safety Act 2021, that is, “an internet service by means of which content that is generated by a user of the service, or uploaded to or shared on the service by a user of the service, may be encountered by another user, or other users, of the service. “ Encrypted or password-protected data storage is a social media platform, if a user can allow other third parties to bypass the encryption and/or password protection, and access files or folders.
  3. The social media platform is controlled by a Netherlands-registered company, whose directors are natural persons resident in the Netherlands.
  4. The social media platform has an office in the Netherlands.
  5. The social media platform has an online complaints procedure, and a physical complaints desk where individuals can lodge complaints in person, about the content available on the platform. A complaint can include a request for removal of content.
  6. The complaints desk is open for at least 40 hours each week, and on at least six days per week.
  7. The platform must reach a decision on complaints within 24 hours, and provide sufficient staff to ensure this. In the event of a backlog, the data centre will suspend services to the social media platform, until the backlog is resolved. 
  8. The social media platform has an explicit censorship policy, which prohibits certain content, and it publishes its list of prohibited content.
  9. The prohibited content list includes minimally:
  • Denial of anthropogenic global warming.
  • Claims that the earth is flat or hollow, and any promotion of flat earth theories and geocentric theories of the Solar System.
  • Virus denial and/or germ denial.
  • Glorification and/or promotion of Benito Mussolini, the Partito Nazionale Fascista, Adolf Hitler, the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, and all other Nazi organisations dissolved by Law Nr. 2 of the Allied Control Council (10 October 1945).
  • All national-socialist propaganda.
  • Uncritical promotion of the works of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Julius Evola, Guillaume Faye, Alain de Benoist, and René Guénon.
  • Advocacy of laws or government policy, directed at racial purity.

First version, December 2021.

The languages of universities

Another upload from my archive website, this time on languages policy, at universities in Europe. For students and staff at English universities, these issues may seem “new”. In fact they were always present: a changing Europe makes them more visible.


the language of teaching
University education in Europe is given in a limited number of official national languages. In countries with a federal structure, or regional autonomy, it is given in the regional language. In addition there are universities that teach in a language from outside the nation/region: in most cases in English. (German-language higher education in eastern Europe, for instance, disappeared after 1945). Similarly, within each university, if a course is given in a non-national language, that is almost always English. Universities in England are the only fully monolingual universities in Europe. (British universities in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales are partly bilingual). In the EU, language is an area reserved to national policy, although some minority languages are protected by European and international instruments. There is no legal status anywhere, for multilingualism as such.

___Issues
Should multilingualism be enforced as a goal in itself?
Should entirely monolingual higher education be effectively forbidden (or left to the private sector)?
Should all European languages be given the protected status, given to some minority languages?
Should courses offered in one language be given in parallel, in other languages?
Should all courses be given in a fixed minimum of languages?
Should international courses especially, be multilingual, or available in parallel versions?
Should there be a maximum on the share of English-language courses?
Should visiting staff be required to speak a minimum of European languages?


the language of course material
The content of courses (books, articles, instructions, manuals, software, databases) has a generally bilingual pattern, except in England. The smaller the teaching language, the more material in other languages. The second language is either the national language, or English. The long-term trend is to have all material in English, as at Dutch universities, in some disciplines. There, Dutch is used for lectures and seminars only (and then only if there are no foreign students).

___Issues
Should students have a right to course material in their native language?
Should students have a right to use multilingual material?
Should students have a right to use (multilingual) material in EU languages?
Aside from the claims of students, should course content and material be multilingual, as a general policy?
Is bilingualism of material (teaching language plus English) an acceptable substitute for multilingualism?
Should compiled works (readers, collections) be multilingual?
Are monolingual (English) works, excluding EU content, acceptable in the EU?
Should software be multilingual?
Does EU policy, on a multilingual information society, also apply to academic software and academic computing centres?
Should course information (folders, syllabus, guides, websites) be multilingual?


library acquisition policy
Again the general trend is to bilingual libraries: language of teaching, plus English. As funds for acquisition of books (and journal subscriptions) are cut, priority goes to “major international texts and journals”. These are usually in English. In England itself, academic libraries are often monolingual.

___Issues
Is justice applicable between languages?
Are there moral obligations of equal acquisition, across languages?
Is there, in any case, a moral preference for multilingual libraries?
Should libraries give preference in acquisition, to multilingual works?
Should all EU languages be given equal library acquisition status with English, in the EU?
Should libraries in the EU give preference in acquisition, to EU languages, or to all European languages?
Should there be a maximum on English-language acquisitions?
If a library refuses to supply a work in an official EU language, is that contrary to European law?
Can a monolingual library be prosecuted under national law, for criminal discrimination?


equal treatment of speakers
Probably, most of the world’s students use a language which is not their native language or dialect. British and US-American students can study in their own countries, and globally, in a standard English close to their native dialect: an extremely privileged group.

___Issues
Should all students be obliged, as a matter of justice, to use a non-native language as part of their university study?
Should English-language students, specifically, be excluded from English-language international courses, to prevent unfair advantage?
Should the number of languages of teaching be greatly increased, to include also non-standard dialects?
Is an examination just or fair, if one student can use a native language, while others must use their fourth or fifth language?
Are migrants (English speakers excepted) systematically disadvantaged at European universities?
Is it just to give protected status (including education facilities) to some minority languages, but not to others?


access to journals and conferences
Issues of justice between speakers, arise also in selection procedures, for journals and conferences. The dominance of English-language publishing is well known. Less obvious is that publishers are also disproportionately located in English-speaking countries. English-language journals also, inevitably have editors and advisors who speak, read and write good academic English. It is not as easy to trace the language of conferences, but English is certainly the dominant language of conferences. A bilingual conference is usually in the teaching language of the host university, plus English. Organisers often require papers in English, even if most of those present understand other languages.

___Issues
The basic issue: is it legitimate for a journal to refuse an article on grounds of language?
Is this refusal discriminatory, and possibly a criminal offence?
Is this refusal morally equivalent to racism?
Should journals, published in the EU, be obliged to accept submissions in all EU official languages?
Is refusal of an article in French by a British journal, for instance, contrary to European law?
Should there be quotas by native language, for journal editors, editorial boards, advisors and reviewers?
Is it acceptable for a journal to refuse a person as editor/advisor, on grounds of language?
Is a requirement to use one language for conference papers legitimate?
Is lack of funds for translation a legitimate reason to limit conference languages?
Should the EU fund monolingual conferences?
Should a minimum number of EU languages be legally required at non-local conferences?
Are existing conference language restrictions contrary to European law?


the language of publication
The long-term trend in journals is, once again, a combination of a dominant global publishing language (English), combined with limited-area journals in official national languages. In effect this fixes the language of contact as English. Multilingual journals are rare.

___Issues
Should the EU enforce (or subsidise) multilingual journals, or parallel publication?
Is it acceptable to publish results of EU-funded research, in English only?
Should research funds, in general, be conditional on multilingual publication?
Is there a general moral obligation to multilingual publication?
Does legal protection of minority languages bind journal publishers to some publication in these languages?

Instability from stability

How liberal democratic nation states can generate their own internal collapse. Another upload from my archive website, this was written in the 1990’s at a time of liberal triumphalism. Some outdated references have been removed.

In prosperous and apparently stable democratic western states, we see conspiracy theories, cults, social paranoia, and now rapid political polarisation. This may be the result of the stability itself: liberal democratic nation states generate instability. Paradoxically, they may become more unstable in the absence of external threats. Global instability may not be the result of global stress, but the the exact opposite: internal social stress caused by global and national stability. It is the interaction of liberal open societies with national culture, which can cause such stability stress.

___LIBERALISM

Liberalism propagates interaction. Liberal ethics claims that:

  • interaction is good in itself
  • interaction of 3 is better that interaction of 2, and so on
  • interaction should be intensified
  • the zone where interaction takes place should be expanded
  • persons may not withdraw from interaction.

This pro-interaction pattern underlies all established liberal democratic structures, and one new one:

  • the market
  • the labour market
  • political debate and exchange of ideas
  • democratic government as market
  • electronic networks

___LIBERAL NATIONS

Increased interaction leads to convergence. Convergence occurs around the core of existing national identity in existing nation states. For instance, products which diverge from national taste will usually fail in the market, and people with values that diverge from national core values will find it difficult to get a job.

Many people like this kind of society: that is one reason for liberalism’s success. Liberalism reconciles the human desire to belong, with desire for individual achievement. Liberal structures do this by allowing people to compete in conformity. Conforming to the norms of an employer, or of the nation, can be emotionally positive and involve much effort. In turn, competition to conform increases the base level of conformity expected. We see this in the labour market: an employer might ban smoking at work, and then introduce nicotine tests for employees, so that they can’t smoke elsewhere either. Employers enforce dress codes at work to control employees appearance, and in extreme cases, require plastic surgery for employees.

People compete not just to get jobs, to make careers, but also in local activism, in emancipation of groups within society, in emancipation of sub-groups within these groups. The national identity is gradually enlarged to include all the citizens, but the price they pay is that they are all expected to join the race to conform to national standards. (Outcast groups within the nation are incompatible with a nation state). A typical example would be a woman who is expected to be excellent in work and career, and also be responsible for children, and at the same time to campaign for an increased role of women. She must conform to prejudices, yet show she can excel within them, and beyond that, challenge them in the interests of a wider national community. Several layers of excellence are required. Most fit into one another, but they cannot all fit perfectly.

___NATIONAL DEMANDS

Nations thus make demands to conform, these are presented to the individual through the liberal structures such as the job market, and the demands increase. In peacetime, at least: compare this situation to that of a nation at war. Front-line soldiers are expected to risk their lives, but not to wear a tie every day, or have plastic surgery. Nations at war typically make a single functional demand on each individual: drive a tank, produce shells, weld aircraft. After war, as the nation returns to peace and stability, the demands to conform to national culture grow again, become more complex, and involve more aspects of life. The pressure comes from all sides – from the market, from employers, social pressures – and there is less and less possibility to evade the demands.

The more the national ideal lifestyle is approached, the greater the pressure to close the gap and achieve “perfection”. That means, for instance, that everyone in the USA becomes a perfect American – in a perfectly American house with a perfectly American lifestyle. However this is an impossibility: it only attracts attention to the remaining divergence from the national culture. Society will seem to be fragmenting, when in fact it is converging. No-one notices in wartime, if your tie does not match your suit: in peactime they will. This presents itself as “erosion of standards”. Pressure on the state to legally enforce national standards will then grow – drug prohibition, alcohol prohibition, re-application of old anti-adultery laws, laws defining legal sexual behaviour. These “convergence laws” are in addition to the wide range of industrial, economic and planning standards all nation states already apply.

In turn the increase in demands can lead to conflict, even in a culture which is in effect 99% conformist. Trivial regulatory matters (smoking in public parks) and trivial national cultural policies (spelling of new words) can become political issues. The last steps towards national unity seem the hardest to take. As total stability is approximated, the visible deviance from the ideal becomes increasingly visible, and instability increases dramatically.

___EXIT FROM THIS PROBLEM

The process described here leads to increasing stress and mistrust of government, even despite consensus on economic, social and foreign policy. It is impossible to predict the nature of this stable yet stressed society – historically there were no permanently peaceful, stable, nation states. However, there are two basic forms of exit from the stress state.

If there is a war, the problem (from the point of view of the nation) is solved. National demands are again reduced to functional demands, and social mobility is restored as the armed forces, government and economy expand. Although a rise in social stress may not directly produce a war, it may contribute to wars on the basis of existing unsolved conflicts, or to defend relatively trivial interests.

The second possibility of exit is more direct. The combination of liberal democratic structures with national identity produces the convergence instability. However national stability is not a goal in itself (except for nationalists). And convergence itself is wrong, and that is reason enough to abolish the combination – to end liberal society, market, and nation. That abolition would not guarantee stability either: but why should stability be guaranteed?

What is antisemitism?

All members of the Jewish people believe, that there ought to be a Jewish people. Antisemitism, at its core, is the rejection of this proposition.

Members of the Jewish people share other beliefs and attitudes, which derive from their core preference for the existence of the Jewish people. We can label these structural beliefs and attitudes as ‘semitism’. Similarly, broader antisemitism is often derived from, or logically related to, the core rejection of the existence preference. Semitism and antisemitism are structurally mirrored.

Just as the Jewish people engenders mirrored semitism and anti-semitism, so every ethnic group engenders its own equivalent mirrored pair of beliefs and attitudes. For every people X, there is an X-ism, and an anti-X-ism. Certainly when the ethnic group is a nation, the anti-X-ism is a form of racism.

So for instance, there is a Hungarianism associated with the Hungarian nation, structurally  mirrored by anti-Hungarianism. And just as with antisemitism, this anti-Hungarianism (anti-Magyarism) is racist. See the Wikipedia category Anti-national Sentiment for more examples. There is no corresponding list for pro-national sentiment, which is often simply reduced to ‘patriotism’.

In all these cases, the existence preference for the people or nation X, is the core proposition of X-ism. Other propositions of X-ism are derived from this preference, or logically follow from it. As it develops, anti-X-ism rejects, in turn, the derived propositions.

Among the main derived elements are the claim to intrinsic value, and the moral judgement that the specific nation or people is good.

It is a reasonable assumption that all members of the Jewish people believe, that the Jewish people has intrinsic value. It is antisemitic to reject this belief. Similarly, all members of the Hungarian people believe, that the Hungarian people has intrinsic value. It is anti-Hungarian to reject this belief.

It is also a reasonable assumption, that many members of the Jewish people believe that the Jewish people is good in itself. Some may believe that a moral judgement on a people is meaningless. It is however certain, that all members of the Jewish people will reject a negative moral judgement on the Jewish people –  any claim that it is morally wrong in any sense. Similarly, members of any other people or nation, will oppose any negative moral judgment on that people or nation. In practice, this results in the sacralisation of the nations and peoples – it is considered taboo to judge them, or to criticise them, or both.

So over time, each nation and people will generate a list of propositions, which are derived from, or reinforce, the original proposition that the nation or people should exist. See the table of semitic and antisemitic positions for more detail. Perhaps these propositions are not always in neat chronological order, but they are logically related to each other. It is legitimate to consider their validity.

Legalise murder

Revised version, September 2022.

The proto-liberal Thomas Hobbes used the idea of a ‘state of nature’ to justify his social ethics. In this ‘state of nature’, individuals would attack those who harmed them, and they would in turn counter-attack. The result would be a violent society, where most people lived in permanent fear.

To avoid this, Hobbes proposed, individuals should lose any claim to self-defence against harm. Only the state would have the authority to prevent harm – if and when the state found that appropriate.

Since the state would not act to prevent every harm to every individual who complained, this was a de facto legalisation of harm. Hobbes did not give historical examples of a ‘state of nature‘ although he apparently believed it had existed. It has legal counterparts in ancient laws which regulated vendettas. Those laws allowed violent reprisals, but (in modern terminology) seek to limit escalation – “an eye for an eye”.

Hobbes wrote during the era of monarchial absolutism, and saw the monarch as the alternative for the ‘state of nature’. Nevertheless this principle became a central element of later liberal ideology, despite the alleged anti-statism of liberalism. It underlies present-day free market liberalism, where competition in the market is legal, no matter what its consequences for individuals and groups. It is prominent in libertarianism, which defines self-defence against harm as ‘initiation of force’, and justifies reprisals against victims of harm who defend themselves.

The de facto legalisation of harm has resulted in the modern liberal society, which is characterised by intense and aggressive competition, extreme social inequalities, and a powerless and helpless underclass. That has been aggravated by subsequent polarisation and fragmentation in these societies, creating a society of multiple mutually hostile minorities, which is not really a ‘society’ anyway. This type society favours cruel and aggressive people: in fact you can make a living, simply by being cruel and nasty on social media.

Every psychiatrist will tell you, that adults must learn to accept cruelty, and that reprisal is child-like and immature. It is true that some people have a very thick skin, are undeterred by hostility, and can cope with personal cruelty and abuse, and function well socially. They can thrive in a liberal society. Most people can’t, however. The psychiatrists are asking too much, and ignoring the massive personal suffering which also characterises liberal society.

Designing the state of nature

To counteract liberalism, I propose the introduction of a Hobbesian state of nature, in a regulated form, which avoids a general bloodbath. On one day every year, it would be legal for people to kill those who harm them.

The proposal includes qualifications, restrictions, and regulation. You should read the entire proposal before forming a judgement, unless your beliefs condemn homicide in all circumstances. (In that case, you can stop reading here). But even with these restrictions and regulatory structures, many people will ask: “Wouldn’t people just use this procedure, to kill their boss, or kill their abusive partner?”

That’s what it’s for. The proposal allows those who have been reduced to desperation by their suffering, and who have no protection under the rule of law, to defend themselves against their persecutors. It is primarily intended for people at the bottom of the social hierarchy, who have no access to the media, the political system, or the media, and who have no lobby or interest group to speak for them. The proposal would, for instance, legalise and regulate ‘workplace shootings’. These may involve employees who have been tormented for years, with the approval of the management, and who finally defend themselves by killing their persecutors.

I am not claiming that all workplace shootings are morally justified, or that all killers were harassed by those they kill. However, the blanket condemnation of homicides, by public opinion and by religious leaders, is not well-founded.

There is a very strong cultural taboo on murder, which extends across cultures and religions. It is probably grounded in an innate genetic revulsion against killing another human, which in turn follows evolutionary logic. Humans are the most effective predators that ever lived on this planet, and if they turned that advantage on themselves, the species would soon be extinct. We are therefore programmed not to kill each other.

In western countries, homicides typically result from escalated non-lethal violence, often under influence of drugs and alcohol, often in domestic disputes. High murder rates in non-western countries are typically related to criminal feuds (as in Mexico), or to simple robbery. Cold-blooded pre-meditated murder, without any of those factors, is an extremely rare crime.

That does seem to reflect an innate taboo, and the assumption should be, that the murderer shares the taboo. There should therefore be a strong presumption, that a premeditated murder without any other motives, such as material gain or sexual gratification, is justified. In other words, if we can see no motive of personal gain or group advantage, we must assume that the murderer had a good reason to kill the victim.

That assumption underlies the proposal to legalise murder. It is also a response to the ethical defects of liberal societies, where weak individuals are deprived of the protection of the state. I will now describe the details of the proposal, but first a disclaimer: this proposal is intended to apply to the territory of the European Union.

The murder procedure

On one day every year, it would be legal for some specific individuals to kill other specific individuals, between sunrise and sunset. Most workplaces and schools would be legally required to close on that day. The state would advise the population to stay indoors, and there might be some form of curfew. The day would be officially named Murder Day, to emphasise its solemn nature: all euphemism would be avoided.

There would be a state agency, the Murder Authority, charged with regulation and supervision of the legalised murder. In the two months after Murder Day, this Authority would assess the events, and alter its procedures if necessary.

Two months after Murder Day, applications would open for the next Murder Day. An adult individual, referred to as The Applicant, can apply to legally kill one other adult individual, referred to as The Target. All legal residents of the state could apply – but not those in prison, since they can not put their application into effect. They will have to wait until the first round of applications after their release.

Two groups would be exempt from the status of Target. First, the staff of the Murder Authority; they must implement the procedures. Second, those in prison or otherwise legally detained: the assumption is, that they can not harm the rest of the population, while in detention. Elected representatives and members of the government would not be exempt.

Each application must state a harm that has been done to the applicant, by the proposed Target. Random or ‘aesthetic’ murders are not allowed. The harm can consist of an action or an inaction, and it can affect the individual or a group. It can therefore include group persecution or discrimination, as well as direct actions against the person of the Applicant.

Each Applicant can kill one Target on the next Murder Day. First come, first served: the first application processed determines who is the Applicant, if more the one person wants to kill the Target. However, each application can include two alternative preferences. Ultimately one Applicant is matched to each Target. The application procedure will close after one month. There are now 9 months to the next Murder Day.

An official of the Murder Authority will inform each nominated target, in person, that they may be legally killed on Murder Day. There will be no lost letters, or other communication errors. The official must be satisfied, that the Target fully understands the procedure and its consequences.

The official of the Murder Authority will name the Applicant, and also inform the Target of the stated harm, that drove the Applicant to seek their death. Every Target will know who wants to kill them, and why.

It will be illegal for third parties to obstruct the killing, on Murder Day or before it. The rich can not escape Murder Day by hiring bodyguards, or having a fortified house built. It will not be illegal for the Target to defend themselves on Murder Day itself: no law could suppress the instinct for self-preservation.

All pre-emptive strikes against the Applicant by the Target (or vice versa), will remain crimes under the normal criminal law. Threats or physical violence against the Applicant, or hiring an assassin, will result in jail for the Target. The Murder Authority will be empowered to use preventive surveillance, to forestall such reprisals or intimidation.

It will however be legal for the Target to offer compensation, through the Murder Authority, for the specific harm done, in the hope that the Applicant will withdraw the application. This is a possible loophole: a widely hated rich man could flood the system with pseudo-applicants, who would then withdraw on receipt of pseudo-compensation. The Murder Authority would be empowered to close such loopholes, for instance by freezing the assets of the Target.

Response to the certainty of death

The procedure is intended to present the Target with the relative certainty, that the Applicant will kill him/her, on the next Murder Day. The Target can respond to that in three ways.

If clearly not responsible for the stated harm, the Target can apply to the Murder Authority to cancel the application to kill. That would apply in cases of mistaken identity, or where the Applicant had misunderstood the status, job, or functions of the Target. If the stated harm is a crime, and the Target had been tried and acquitted for that crime, the Murder Authority would take that as definitive proof that the Target was not responsible for that specific harm.

However, Targets could not otherwise dispute responsibility, or attempt to justify the harm done. What may seem a trivial incident to one person, might cause lifetime suffering to another. Some Targets will simply have to accept, that someone else wants to kill them, perhaps for something they did a long time ago. In that case the second option would apply.

The second option is exile. Each Target can apply to the Murder Authority, to go into permanent exile from the state. If they are a citizen, their citizenship would be revoked. If they are a non-citizen, any visa or residence permit would be revoked. In both cases, they would be assisted to leave the state, and forbidden from re-entering it, with deterrent penalties to ensure compliance. The application to kill them would then be cancelled.

Probably, most people would choose this option. They would simply flee the country, and the procedures would be designed to facilitate that. However, there would be some people, who would reject the stated justification for their death, who felt that they had done no wrong, and that it was the Applicant who was morally in the wrong.

In such cases, in the following two months, the Target can lodge a Counter-Application. That would entitle them to legally kill the respective Applicant on Murder Day. The same qualifications and restrictions would apply: everyone will be clearly informed, third parties may not obstruct the killing, and pre-emptive strikes remain illegal for both parties.

All application procedures will then close: it is now 7 months to Murder Day. In the following 6 months, the Applicants who have themselves become Targets can choose the option of exile. That will be treated as a withdrawal of their original application: both the original and the counter-application will be cancelled. (All Targets retain the option of choosing exile).

In the following 6 months, many of the proposed Targets (those who have not lodged a Counter-Application) will go into exile. As Murder Day approaches, some of the Counter-Applicants will change their minds, and they too will opt for exile.

One month before Murder Day, all Applicants and Targets will be required to report to the Murder Authority. If any Applicant or Counter-Applicant fails to report, their application will be cancelled. If they are Counter-Applicants and thus also a Target, their failure to report will be treated as an application for exile. Their citizenship or visa will be revoked, and the Murder Authority will be authorised to track them down, and deport them. The original Application will also be cancelled. The implementation of the exile provisions must be treated seriously, otherwise no-shows could simply evade Murder Day.

In the month preceding Murder Day, all Applicants and Targets will be required to remain in the state. The Murder Authority will be authorised to monitor their movement. Again, leaving the country in this period will mean loss of citizenship and permanent exile. The option of formally choosing exile will remain open as long as practicable, for instance until the evening before Murder Day. Any Applicant can formally withdraw their Application at any time: the Murder Authority will make itself accessible at all times, during the last month. There would be no compulsion to kill.

Murder Day

By the evening before Murder Day, many of the original applications will have been withdrawn, or resulted in exile. However, there will still be those who have suffered so much, or are so determined, that they welcome Murder Day.

And so, on Murder Day, they will attempt to kill. In some cases, they will attempt to kill each other. Even that will be subject to regulation: methods which endanger third parties, such as arson or explosives, will not be permitted. Since the whole point of Murder Day is that the state allows murder, it might be reasonable that the state provides the applicants with a firearm, and trains them to use it effectively.

Some Targets will hide. That would be permitted, and they might survive. However, they will spend the day in extreme fear, and two months later they can expect a new application, and another year in fear of death. The same goes for cases where the applicant simply failed: shot and missed, ran out of ammunition, or took fright. They can try again next year.

Some Targets will have entered Counter-Applications. They will succeed in killing their attacker first, or killing them in a confrontation, a shoot-out. In that case, the threat has passed. However, in all probability, an official of the Murder Authority will arrive two months later, to tell them they are now a Target, for friends or family of the person they killed.

And in some cases one person will simply murder another, fully legally, because of the harm that the victim had done to the killer. The underlying assumption behind the entire legalisation proposal is, that the harm would be so great, the circumstances, so extreme, and the lack of state protection so absolute, that this murder would be justified.

Beginning at sunset on Murder Day, the Murder Authority will assess the results, check on the whereabouts of all Applicants and Targets, and begin the disposal of the dead. All murders will be fully reported to the public, including the names of Applicants and Target, and the stated harm. Two months later, applications will open for the following Murder Day.

A non-universal proposal

Two points for those who are disgusted by this proposal. First, you would not have to live in such a society. I am not suggesting that the whole world should be like this. In fact, the proposal is specifically designed for the existing European liberal-democratic states, which individuals are free to leave.

But if you did live in such a society, and you feared violent death, how could you avoid it? The answer is simple: don’t harm anyone, and especially don’t harm the weak.

And if you feared a world like this, what could you advocate, to prevent it coming into existence? You could demand that the state protect the individual from harm. That’s what drives the proposal, as indicated at the beginning: the failure of the liberal state, to comprehensively protect the citizen from others.

Market ethics, business ethics

Another upload from my archive website, this comment on market ethics was written in the late 1990’s. Moral action in the market consists of ending the market: the market is inherently wrong, and business ethics consists of ending the business.

The ethics of business cannot be separated from the ethics of the free market economy as a whole. Some pro-business ethical theorists take this view in a different sense to that meant here. They argue that there is in effect no business ethics in the usual sense, that the framework of the market releases individuals and organisations from ethical obligation.

Carr, A. Z. 1968 Is business bluffing ethical? in Harvard Business Review January/February 1968, p. 143-153.
Gauthier, D. 1986 Morals by agreement Oxford: Clarendon.

Carr compares the market to a card game: the rules of the game are the only rules, a separate ethic:

We can learn a good deal about the nature of business by comparing it with poker….No one expects poker to be played on the ethical principles preached in churches….. An executive’s family life can easily be dislocated if he fails to make a sharp distinction between the ethical systems of the home and the office – or if his wife does not grasp that distinction…. Many wives are not prepared to accept the fact that business operates with a special code of ethics (Carr, 149; 152).

Even if this were true, there could still be ethical grounds for not playing the game, for not having a market. I will therefore start with the ethics of the free market as a whole, with the question of why there should be a market at all.

Historically the defence of the free market came before “business ethics” – although there were ethical concerns about fair trading before modern economies. The market referred to in this article is the modern version. Market is a misleading name, because there were markets before modern capitalist economies. A better term for what pro-market groups have in mind might be: open-ended unregulated competitive exchange markets. Open-ended, since exchange does not stop after certain transfers have been effected; unregulated, at least in principle; and competitive in that there is no pre-agreed limit on the activities of participants. The market is the main example of a class which Hayek called catallaxies, systems of competitive exchange, not necessarily involving money or products.

Hayek, J. 1976 Law, legislation and liberty. London: Routledge.

The generally used justification of the market is the welfare of the community, more specifically, a high gross national product (GNP) per capita. This is not an ethical goal as such, and defenders of market ethics try to avoid simple appeals to money or products as legitimising factors. This was also the case with the first advocates of the modern economy. Albert Hirschman explains they were more concerned with its civilising influence and pacifying effect – the “balance of interests” replacing the “wild passions”.

Hirschmann, Albert. 1977 The passions and the interests:
political arguments for capitalism before its triumph.
 Princeton: Princeton University Press.

The influence of Newtonian physics here is obvious, as it is in the concept of “balance of power” which dates from the same period. So although the free market is now considered to be the opposite of regulation, its first political defenders valued it for precisely the regulation which seemed impossible for states and governments. But still it was regulation on behalf of something: the nation. The modern market emerged alongside the modern nation states in Europe. The clearest indication of this link is that so few market advocates saw the market as replacing the existing states. The apparent paradox, that a capitalist world economy did not lead to a capitalist world state is resolved if market liberalism is seen as a form of organicism. The idea of an economic body replaced (partly) the idea of the body politic, leaving the number of bodies (states) unchanged. In this view, within the state the market was a harmonising, integrating and civilising force or instrument, and among states it was a brake on war. With the addition of economic growth as a goal and GNP as a measure, this is still a widely accepted view: Francis Fukuyama could be said to represent its current version.

Two things can be said about this model. First, as the contrast in Hirschman’s title (passions and interests) implies, it rests on a broader opposition between nature and civilisation. If it is used as a justification, it relies on a negative value for nature. In particular it relies on an association of fanaticism and extremism with “nature”, and of compromise, balance and moderation with “civilisation”. The historical precedent that the first free market liberals had in mind was religious war in Europe. It is part of liberal historical propaganda that Europe was saved from repetition by the wise founders of liberalism, the Lockes and the Humes. However fanaticism in defence of the ethical is not wrong. If the market did “tame passions” in this way, as a sort of ethical tranquilliser, that would be reason enough to reject it.

The second point is that internal or external harmony, balance, welfare or growth are all disputed goals of the state or community. There are some very different visions of what the state is for, including those of empire, ethnicity, and victory in war as ultimate goal of every state. There is no consensus on the goal of the state, of any political community, of any economy. These goals themselves are subject to ethical assessment. So: even if the market were good for a state, or nation, or people, that might in some cases be reason to reject it.

Current neo-liberal justifications of the market seem more abstract than their predecessors. Hayek probably goes furthest in expanding the concept of the market, in effect including politics as another system of exchange, a catallaxy. For Hayek the market is there to order preferences in some way to which he attributes a nearly mystical status. Although Hayek himself denied a connection, the influence of the Thomistic concept of “ordo” is recognisable in this work. A neo-Thomistic justification of the market could be that ordering of preferences is a form of knowledge, which is desirable in itself. At its most explicit it may claim that God’s plan becomes apparent in the working of the market. This is not an internally consistent view, for the same could be said of a planned economy, but more importantly, there is no ethical justification for ordering preferences in this way.

For the market the opposite seems to be true. By mixing preferences and choices, the market removes a direct cause-and-effect relation between choice and outcome. Formally, the market destroys the moral autonomy of the subject, which is sometimes used to justify it. The difficulty of organising boycotts on ethical grounds is a practical expression of this underlying defect of the market. Not just one company must be boycotted, but all its suppliers, and their suppliers, and so on, and ideally all consumers must also join the boycott. In effect, withdrawal into subsistence agriculture is the only way to effect such a boycott.

The market therefore cannot be derived from the rational pursuit of an individual goal: the market virtually eliminates this possibility. A hypothetical rational individual, as in some social contract theories, would never enter into a competitive market system, but would always insist on an autarkic base. A rational individual would not enter into competition unless there was no alternative. Competition is after all a guarantee that interests will be damaged in some way. Similarly the market cannot be derived from competitive-game theories, since no rational actor would consistently enter such a game unless no non-competitive or risk-free alternative was available.

All justifications of the market call on a higher goal than self-interest. The market serves, it is said, to increase prosperity, or welfare, to bring peace, to order choices, to expand or intensify knowledge and so on. Those who advocate the market are propagating a value system of some kind. The question is then whether they do so in a way that leaves choice open to others. Is everyone free to leave the free market? How voluntary is the market for real persons?

The market economy is historically expansionist, as both Marx and Fukuyama agree. It possesses an apparently inherent tendency to growth. However this may not be a property of the market itself, but of its supporters. In other words the market may be capable of co-existing with non-market systems, but its supporters may not want it to. Its expansion may be political, or geopolitical, or ideological, rather than economic.

Whatever the case, the expansion of the market is now almost complete: the whole world participates in the market to some extent. This was true even before “1989”, since all the centrally planned economies were integrated into world trade: none of them ever aimed for or reached full autarky. The expansion in depth of the market continues. Probably within a generation the situation globally will be that which now exists in the industrialised countries, that the alternative of self-sufficiency is no longer real. In this situation it is easy to give examples of how difficult it is to extract yourself from a market economy.

A good example is the impossibility of entering into a non-competition agreement. Imagine an ethical group which wants to end injustice in employment, specifically the tendency of employers to reject the weakest candidates for employment. The group sets up a factory to make a mass product, and employs only those usually rejected by the rest of the labour market: migrants, the disabled, the illiterate, ex-psychiatric patients, and so on. Where necessary the group provides training and support. The result is that their labour costs per unit product are far higher than normal. In the normal working of the market they will sell nothing in competition with the large efficient, prejudiced, producers of the same mass product. Imagine the group therefore asks the large corporations to relinquish a proportional share of the market. How many businesses would do anything but laugh at this request? there is probably no single competitive firm (enterprise) which would sign away the basic principle of its own existence like this. Nor can the ethical group retreat to a protected sector. There is no alternative non-market economy which the market economy carries inside it. There are some remnants of “non-profit” production – beer made in monasteries – but they are sold on the free market. They are not guaranteed against competition. The end result is that the (in reality usually state-organised) workplaces for “unemployable” groups are driven by market forces into low-wage assembly work, the only activity where they can compete. Not only is there no non-market sector, but where there are existing state monopolies – electricity, post, telecommunication – the trend is to privatise them all. (There seems to be no case where an existing state monopoly was handed over to a non-entrepreneurial organisation: they all pass to the private sector).

Such examples, and there are many, indicate that the market is absolute. Market means 100% market. There is no way out of it, and since most people who live in free market economies were born into them, the market cannot be said to be voluntary. It is imposed, probably with the support of the majority, but still imposed. The decision makers here are the entrepreneurs, the support of the majority is passive. In this there is no political distinction between entrepreneurs and (for instance) islamist radicals, who also understand that they can at most rely on passive support from a majority. “Business” is a movement propagating a system of beliefs and values, which has succeeded in imposing that system because many people accept it. The core of that value system is competitive interaction in the market.

Competition

Competition is wrong in itself. It directly contravenes the principle of non-malevolence: that all other things being equal, persons should not harm others. Competition entered into voluntarily may fall outside this principle, but the market is not voluntary. Competition is central to free markets , although not necessarily part of a monetary economy. Competition is harm. The essence of the value system of the free market is harm to others, as a goal.

Entrepreneurs are not pursuing their own profits in a free market economy. The profit motive is not central to the free market economy, and may not even exist in reality. It is a great propaganda victory for the advocates of the free market economy that they have succeeded in convincing even their opponents that they are seeking profit.

What do entrepreneurs, business men and women, do in reality? They sell poisonous cooking oil causing hundreds of deaths. They build unsafe buildings in earthquake zones. They neglect safety regulations in mines. They send unsafe, uncertified and inherently unstable ferries to sea in storms. A business in Beijing collected disposable injection needles, washed them, repackaged them, and sold them as new. That is a classic case of the business mentality: not profit maximisation, but harm maximisation, is the norm.

Harm is inherent to the working of the market. All businesses compete: they cause other businesses to suffer losses, or to go bankrupt. In turn, the pressure on the business as employer causes harm to employees. Their pay may be reduced, they may lose their job. In turn that leads to material losses, to a decline in health, even to suicide. The principle of competition prevails not just among firms but within them. Almost all employers in free markets select their employees by competitive selection. Discrimination is the almost inevitable result. The weak (a category which varies in different societies) are disadvantaged by definition. The harm to employees is cumulative. Those who have not had a good job in the past are less likely to get one in the future. Such cumulative harm – punishing the victim – is an injustice in itself. It is moral for those who can – the employees within firms – to prevent harm, and therefore to sabotage competition. The most responsible and limited method is through theft of strategic business information, and then passing this on to competitors, or making it publicly available.

It is not only through competitive harm that enterprises act unethically. Firms react to the market, and that is wrong if there no ethical limits on how far this reaction should go. It is unethical if organisations are market-oriented: they should be ethics-oriented. That applies also to such formulas as customer-friendly, service-oriented and demand-led. It ought to be obvious, but unfortunately it needs to be stated: neither the market, nor the customer, nor demand are good (and certainly not the supreme good, which is how some people think of them). A belief in an invisible hand is not a licence to act unethically. If firms are to act ethically, they must be prepared to ignore the market, the customer, and their own survival. At a an absolute minimum, the statute by which the firm is incorporated should clearly state that the aim of the firm is to do good – to act ethically (even if no more specific ethic is named). Needless to say, no firm I know of meets even this minimum criterion.

The reality is that the market selects, and in this selection is more likely to amplify unethical behaviour than reduce it, when no participant firm is committed even formally to ethical behaviour. Firms bring their own prejudices to the market, their choice of who to harm. A representative of a major automobile firm once told me they had chosen not to sponsor black musicians in an advertising campaign, because “Blacks are not one of our target markets”. Firms in several European countries regularly sponsor right wing student (fraternity) organisations. Such behaviour is considered normal for business: in these two cases, you would not expect a large company to sponsor minorities, or any firm to sponsor left-wing groups. Being normal and accepted is not however an ethical standard in itself.

Although businesses harm, they cannot pursue a strategy of open-ended and undirected harm. Long-term harm maximisation requires that the market, and some enterprises at least, continue to exist. Business therefore also selects for conformity to the market, and reinforcement of it. In selecting suppliers, in hiring personnel, in their choice of markets for their products, business “rewards” those who chose the market above ethics. Business cultivates its own style in clothes, its own use of language, its own mentality. Sometimes, as in student business games, people who do not belong to a firm are deliberately trained to harm others. This selection, cultivation, and reinforcement of something which is unethical, is unethical in itself.

Even without the goods and services it produces “business” is therefore an important social factor. In effect it makes group choices: there really is such a thing as “business” or “the business community”. Those choices are in general conservative, as would be expected from a movement which has largely succeeded in imposing its value system, and so partly constitutes the status quo. Business is against technological change, making it subordinate to wealth and prosperity. (A world committed to technological change would not be rich. It might have a very low standard of living, as most products available would be imperfect prototypes.) In fact it could be said that the attitude of business to technology is humanist in a broad sense: given alternatives technologies, business will always chose the human-friendly above the innovative.

It seems that this is part of the reason why so many people support a free market economy with harm as its central principle. In some way they seem to recognise that the market forms an effective barrier against change, especially technological change.

Ending the market

What ethical actions can be taken against entrepreneurs and the market?

Firstly the death penalty should be introduced for serious cases of entrepreneurship: where the harm done involves the death of many people. In fact it is not a penalty, in the sense of punishment, but an administrative measure to reduce serious harm. The assumption is that entrepreneurs are committed to their value system, and that in some cases execution is the only effective way to stop them. Prisoners escape, exiles return, but the dead stay dead. Entrepreneurs should be given a chance to stop their activities: only in serious cases of repeated serious entrepreneurship should the death penalty be applied. Lesser penalties should also be applied, to stop lesser harm.

Secondly, it is moral for entrepreneurial organisations – “businesses” – not to compete with each other. They should form ethical cartels to serve ethical goals. If they do not do this, employees should try to force the forming of ethical cartels by undermining competition.

Thirdly , if businesses remain active, it is moral for the state to create a protected ethical sector. Since nation states are based on national values, and on the principle of integration around these values, this implies that a separate non-national ethically based zone be set up. That is in effect a state, a market-free state. In the final analysis this is the best solution tot the problem of the market. Once non-market states exist alongside market states, people can chose which they want to inhabit. A market state in which people have freely chosen to enter into competition is ethically acceptable. The choice must be really free – not based on hypothetical social contracts, but on migration by adults who realise what they are entering into.

In Europe therefore, the ethics of the market indicate a territorial reorganisation, following the abolition of the existing comprehensive nation states. A single European state can effect the abolition, and then re-allocate territory on an ethical basis. It is clear that the inability of the nation state to allocate territory on the basis of ethical values is an obstacle to an ethical approach to entrepreneurs and the market. As long as the national principle is dominant – the principle that historically grounded communities have a monopoly of state formation – there will be no ethics of business.

Cyberspace beliefs

This list was written in the 1990’s, as an attempt to summarise the worldview of the supporters of cyberspace, as it was then called. For clarity: these are not my views, and were not in the 1990’s. The list still seems to be an accurate summary of a certain techno-liberal worldview.

PROCESS

  • Process legitimises outcome.

ACCESS

  • Access to harm legitimises harm.
  • Equality of access legitimises harm.
  • Equality of access legitimises inequality of outcome.
  • Equality of access legitimises other inequalities.
  • A decision to grant access is a gift, and therefore inherently good.
  • An elite which grants access, is better than equality without access.

COMMUNICATION

  • Communication legitimises harm.
  • Communication legitimises injustice.
  • Communication legitimises inequality.
  • Communication has priority over justice.
  • Communication has priority over innovation.
  • Dialogue is preferable to justice.

INTERACTION

  • Interaction legitimises harm.
  • Interaction legitimises injustice.
  • Interaction legitimises inequality
  • Interaction has priority over justice.
  • Interaction has priority over innovation.
  • Interaction overrides individual autonomy.

DEMOCRACY

  • Democracy legitimises injustice.
  • Democracy legitimises inequality
  • Democracy has priority over justice.
  • Democracy has priority over innovation.
  • Individuals must accept collective democratic decision.

INFORMATION

  • All information can flow.
  • All information must flow.
  • There are no negative consequences of information flow.
  • No flowing information conflicts with other flowing information.

KNOWLEDGE

  • Knowledge is good.
  • All knowledge is equally good.
  • No knowledge should be destroyed.
  • Knowledge is cumulative.
  • Flow of information cumulates knowledge.
  • Knowledge is singular: there is no alternative or dissident knowledge.
  • Knowledge has priority over innovation.

HISTORY

  • Global history progresses as a global unit.
  • Global unity intensifies.
  • Global history is singular: there is no other separate history.
  • History is linear.
  • The world undergoes a series of transitions, forming a linear sequence.
  • The most accurate number, to describe historical stages or transitions, is the number three.
  • History is a path, with only three possibilities: standing still, going forward or turning back.
  • The emergent is good.
  • The emergent is better than the possible.
  • Emergent stability has priority over possible innovation.

TECHNOLOGY

  • Technology is a unit: there are no separate technologies.
  • Technology progresses as a unit through time.
  • Technology is transformed as a unit.
  • The transformation of technology is equivalent to historical process.
  • A single technology, in a single linear historical process, undergoes singular unitary transition from one phase or stage, to the next phase or stage.
  • The transition to an information society / information age, is such a singular unitary transition.
  • A sequence of single unitary linear transitions is progress or development.
  • Only one possible sequence may be described as progress or development.
  • Global technological transitions are not subject to rejection on moral grounds.
  • Global technological transitions are either good, or inevitable and beyond moral judgement.
  • Global technological transitions legitimise their own existence, against alternative possibilities.
  • Technology as a unit progresses from few links to many links.
  • Technology becomes more unitary.
  • Technology tends towards global perfection of communication and interaction.
  • Technology of communication and interaction, is better than technology of separation or autonomy.
  • Advances, in technology of separation or autonomy, are not technical progress.

SOCIETY AND INDIVIDUAL

  • Society is a unit.
  • A global society is preferable.
  • Autonomy from global society is undesirable.
  • Society overrides individual autonomy.
  • Individual freedom consists only in the freedom to interact or communicate.
  • People who support the information society are more in touch with history than those who oppose it.
  • People who build an information society or cyberspace are talented: those who oppose it have personally failed.
  • Opponents of an information society have less value as persons, than those who build it.

US AND EUROPE

  • No link between the US and Europe should be cut.
  • Protection of links from the US to Europe, is protection of freedom.
  • If no other means are effective, then military intervention, to protect the freedom to link to the US, is legitimate.
  • Political claims in favour the information society or cyberspace, made in English only, can be applied to people who do not read or speak English.

Open and closed societies

Another upload from my archive website. This dates from the late 1990’s and criticises the now-defunct extropian movement. This was often seen as a form of transhumanism, but their manifesto (The Extropian Principles) was classically liberal. Their version left, my oppositional version right.

OPEN SOCIETYCLOSED SOCIETIES
Extropians value open societies that protect the free exchange of ideas, the freedom to criticize, and the liberty to experiment. More dangerous than bad ideas is the coercive suppression of bad ideas. Better ideas must be allowed to emerge in our institutions through an evolutionary process of creation,mutation, and critical selection. The freedom of expression of an open society is best protected by a social order characterized by voluntary relationships and exchanges. We oppose self-proclaimed and involuntarily imposed “authorities”, and we are skeptical of coercive political solutions,unquestioning obedience to leaders, and inflexible hierarchies that smother initiative and intelligence.Innovators value closed societies that prevent the free exchange of conservative ideas, restrict conservatives freedom to criticise, and therefore guarantee the liberty to experiment. The coercive suppression of conservative ideas is better than allowing their free circulation. Innovative ideas will never emerge in neoliberal social institutions, where they have to go through an evolutionary process of creation, mutation, and critical selection by conservatives. The freedom of innovation in a closed innovative society is best protected, by avoiding relationships and exchanges with conservatives. We oppose self-proclaimed and involuntarily imposed “open societies”, and we are skeptical of coercive market solutions,unquestioning obedience to entrepreneurs, and inflexible conformity to market forces – which smothers initiative and intelligence.
We apply critical rationalism to society by holding all institutions and processes open to continued improvement. Sustained progress and effective,rational decision-making require the diverse sources of information and differing perspectives that flourish in open societies. Centralized command of behavior constrains exploration, diversity, and dissenting opinion.We apply innovation to society by abolishing all its institutions and processes, instead of improving them. Large-scale innovation is not a form of effective, rational decision-making – since it abolishes the norms by which efficiency could be judged. It can certainly do without conservative sources of information, and the family-values, nationalist and traditionalist perspectives that flourish in open societies. Instead, centralised suppression of conservative behavior permits innovation..
We can pursue extropian goals in numerous types of open social orders but not in theocracies or authoritarian or totalitarian systems. Societies with pervasive and coercively enforced centralized control cannot allow dissent and diversity.Conservatives can pursue their goals in numerous types of open social orders, but fortunately a totalitarian-innovative State could lock them up. Network societies with pervasive and coercively enforced participation in “evolutionary” processes cannot allow dissent and diversity.
Yet open societies can allow institutions of all kinds to exist – whether participatory, autonomy-maximizing institutions or hierarchical, bureaucratic institutions. Within an open society individuals,through their voluntary consent, may choose to submit themselves to more restrictive arrangements in the form of clubs, private communities, or corporate entities.Yet a plurality of closed societies would allow institutions of all kinds to exist – whether participatory, autonomy-maximizing institutions or hierarchical, bureaucratic institutions. Nevertheless conservatives prefer a single “open society”. Within an open society individuals – even those who never voluntarily consented to that open society – are submitted to the restrictive arrangements of the global social network: the sum of pressure from numerous lobbies, clubs, private communities, and corporate entities.
Open societies allow more rigidly organized social structures to exist so long as individuals are free to leave. By serving as a framework within which social experimentation can proceed, open societies encourage exploration, innovation, and progress.Open societies are among the most rigidly organized social structures that exist: because the rulers are convinced their society is perfect, no individuals are free to leave. By insisting that social experimentation must proceed only within this “framework”, open societies limit exploration, innovation, and progress.
Extropians avoid utopian plans for “the perfect society”, instead appreciating the diversity in values, lifestyle preferences, and approaches to solving problems.Innovators design utopian plans for “perfect societies”, instead of attempting to find a lowest common denominator among diverse values, or founding society on consumerist “lifestyles”. These utopias have value in themselves, and are not designed to “solve problems”, as if the universe were a school IQ test.
Irn place of the static perfection of a utopia, we prefer an “extropia” – simply an open, evolving framework allowing individuals and voluntary groupings to form the institutions and social forms they prefer. Even where we find some of those choices mistaken or foolish, we affirm the value of a system that allows all ideas to be tried with the consent of those involved.In place of a single “extropia” – an open, evolving framework shared with conservatives – innovators prefer a multiplicity of closed societies, allowing innovative individuals and voluntary groupings to abolish as many institutions and social forms as they can. Innovators find conservatives mistaken or foolish at best, and see no value in a system that allows their ideas to be tried simply because they consent to it.
We have no use for the technocratic idea of coercive central control by self-proclaimed experts. No group of experts can understand and control the endless complexity of an economy and society composed of other individuals like themselves. Unlike utopians of all stripes, Extropians do not seek to control the details of people’s live or the forms and functions of institutions according to a grand over-arching plan. Since we all live in society, we are deeply concerned with its improvement. But that improvement must respect the individual.We have no use for the “network society” idea of coercive decentral control by billions of self-proclaimed experts. With closed societies, innovators need not waste time in understanding and controlling the endless complexity of a single global economy and society. Unlike the Extropians of the Stars and Stripes, European utopians ignore the details of people’s lives, and instead design new forms and functions of institutions, according to innovative grand plans. At present, unfortunately, we all live in “society”, although we are deeply divided on what constitutes its “improvement”. But conservatives must learn to respect the innovative individual.
Social engineering should be piecemeal as we enhance institutions one by one on a voluntary basis, not through a centrally planned coercive implementation of a single vision. We seek continually to improve social institutions and economic mechanisms. Yet we recognize the difficulties in improving complex systems.Social engineering would be slower than piecemeal, if we had to convince conservatives one by one on a voluntary basis. The fastest route to innovation is a centrally planned coercive implementation of a single vision. We seek to abolish existing social institutions and economic mechanisms, rather than slowly improve complex traditional systems.
We are radical in intent but cautious in approach, being aware that alterations to complex systems bring unintended consequences. Simultaneous experimentation with numerous possible solutions and improvements – social parallel processing – works better than utopian centrally administered technocracy.Extropians are radical in their conservatism but methodical in approach, being aware that alterations in complex systems means unintended delays for innovation. They demand simultaneous experimentation with numerous possible solutions and improvements within society, instead of a new utopian vision outside that society. Treating society as a computer – “social parallel processing” – is the worst kind of extropian traditionalist technocracy.
We see all law and government not as ends in themselves but as means to happiness and progress. We do not attach ourselves to any particular laws or economic structures as ultimate ends. We favor those laws and policies which at any time seem most conducive to maintaining and expanding the openness and progress of society. To foster open societies we oppose dangerous concentrations of coercive power and we favor the rule of law instead of the arbitrary rule of authorities. Recognizing that coercive power corrupts and leads to the suppression of alternative ideas and practices, we favor applying rules and laws equally to legislators and enforcers without exception. We champion open societies as frameworks for the peaceful, productive pursuit of individual and group goals.We see innovative law and government as ends in themselves, certainly not as a means to happiness and progress. In fact, all innovations are ultimate ends in themselves. We favour relocating people in new closed states, with laws and policies which are most innovative, rather than maintaining and expanding an existing open society, with its dangerous diffusion of conservative power. We favour innovation above the the “rule of law”, which arbitrarily concentrates power in the hands of judicial authorities. Recognizing that a global open society of 6 billion litigatious conservatives would suppress alternative ideas and practices, more effectively than any corrupt dictator, we favor exempting innovation from any rules and laws which hinder it. But since open societies offer frameworks for the productive pursuit of conservative goals, the best thing is to remove innovation from their reach entirely.
Extropians seek neither to rule nor to be ruled. We hold that individuals should be in charge of their own lives.
Innovators seek to rule conservatives: if you don’t rule them, they will rule you. We hold that individuals should be in charge of their own decision on whether to live in an open society, or not.
Healthy societies require a combination of liberty and responsibility. For open societies to exist,individuals must be free to pursue their own interests in their own way. But for individuals and societies to flourish, liberty must come with personal responsibility. The demand for freedom without responsibility is an adolescent’s demand for license.Those who talk about “healthy societies” exhibit a combination of Darwinism and neo-fascism. If many closed societies exist, innovative individuals are free to pursue their own interests in their own way. But neo-fascists who want societies to “flourish” as if they were crops, insist that liberty must come with personal responsibility. That is why they use Mussolini-style exhortations like: “The demand for freedom without responsibility is an adolescent’s demand for license.”

HYPERCHANGE: comparing the existing to the possible

Another upload from my Dutch archive website, this list was written in the late 1990’s. Defunct links have been removed, and one word has been ‘cancelled’ (transsexual).

Listing radical changes can indicate if existing social/political structures function to exclude radical change. It can help to assess claims that rapid change is occurring. If social, political and geopolitical and geopolitical structures are constructed to block change, then it should be possible to indicate changes which are being blocked. A list of possible changes can be used to ask people if they oppose them, and if they act to oppose them (testing intentionality). The list can indicate that no radical change occurs, and disprove any claim that maximum change occurs already. Here are some categories of possible radical change …

Territorial split maximisation

This implies maximising the spatial differentiation of all aspects of culture and society: 

  • if a person makes a political claim on another person, which the second person rejects, that should be considered a demand to territorial separation. This would maximise secession.
  • separate states for all political parties: this would not maximise secession but would dramatically increase the number of states
  • a choice of multiple urban models for people to migrate to, based for instance on density variants

 Although states may differ in culture and language, there are few historical examples of states which are different as states. Early 19th century Prussia, seen by other Germans, is a possible example.

Dispersion of state privileges

This involves the transfer of monopolies and privileges of the state to other groups or organisations: 

  • nuclear weapons for non-state minorities, such as the transgender minority. Or indeed for non-state majorities: women have no nuclear weapons at present.
  • women’s armies
  • multiple parliaments. The analogy is with the “Muslim Parliament” set up in Britain at the height of the Rushdie affair. Although it had no electorate, no legitimacy, and virtually no support, it provoked outrage by the mere use of the name Parliament. The unity of national institutions in nation states is sacred.
  • multiple legislation, which could possibly originate from a single legislature
  • multiple police forces

Intensification/speed

An intensification of existing technology would have drastic social consequences. However, unlike the other categories on this list, such changes cannot be effected by simple decision:

  • a tenfold increase in infrastructure construction speed to 10 km per day
  • in housing construction, a productivity increase to one house per worker per day
  • a tenfold reduction in freight cost
  • possible rapid construction of low energy use industrial plant, relatively independent of infrastructure defects (for areas like sub-Saharan Africa)

Although not feasible at present, none of these requires science-fiction technology, or new principles in physics, or investment in excess of world production.

Construction of single new systems or structures

Although there are many plans for single projects, in practice most construction is an expansion or alteration of an existing system or structure. The proposed high capacity freight rail links in France, and the introduction of new rail freight handling systems such as Commutor, are examples of relatively independent large projects. (Relatively independent of existing infrastructure). See also any list of mega-technology projects, associated with transhuman or extropian ideas. (Note that in these “posthuman” philosophies, technology is rigidly limited to the service of humans, and their successor entities. This in itself can be a form of technological conservatism, since it vetoes a large number of possible technologies).

Desacralisation

A large part of culture is considered sacred, often for no valid reason. These aspects of culture, for instance, can be de-sacralised

  • heritage
  • treaties and treaty obligations
  • art
  • the names of places (consider the reaction in Britain to a change in the name of London, to Eurograd)
  • personal names: allocating numbers for names is a stereotype of fictional tyrannies or dystopias. It is considered horrible, although there are no apparent moral objections.

Reversals

A good example of simple reversal can be taken from the policy of nation states toward immigrants. Reversal could simply take the form of a requiring citizens in any one nation to register with the police, provide evidence of a legal income, and so on. If they could not meet the same conditions as migrants, they would be deported to another nation, where as migrants they would regain their original status.

Anti-nationalist policies in Europe could take this general form: note that they would almost certainly be described as cultural genocide.

Patterns

Edmund Burke, the “father of English Conservatism”, feared the division of France into hexagons. Fear of geometrical or abstract patterns, replacing the “organic” world, recurs in right wing conspiracy theories:

  • replacing names by numbers
  • systematic re-naming of cities
  • the decimal day, the decimal week

Again, there are no apparent moral objections – which does not mean that the conspiracy theory should necessarily be acted out. (One Argentine conspiracy theory concerned a Jewish plot, to rebuild Buenos Aries in the shape of a Star of David. Although this is a pointless exercise, it would not harm anybody).

Criminalisation

Many actions are not crimes, and never have been. They provide a reservoir of possible crimes – for example criminalising …

  • specific cities for their structure (the administration becoming liable, for instance, for having too many roads)
  • cars
  • liberalism
  • harmful but accepted patterns of behaviour, such as snobbism
  • crimes against Europe
  • crimes against justice

Science contra Europa

Uploading old items from my Dutch website. This comment was written in the late 1990’s.

Science and its critics confuse two things: universal scientific truth, and the value of the existing world. It is possible for science to be anti-Europe, even if there is a universal scientific truth, accurately discovered. A simple example can show how scientists think. A scientist would say:

  • (a) There is a planet Jupiter
  • (b) Therefore there is no moral or political question about Jupiter being right or wrong: the issue should not even be discussed.

The first part might be true, the second part is an ethical judgement, with political consequences. If you think like this, then you will probably also say this:

  • (a) There are nation states in Europe
  • (b) Therefore there is no moral or political question about nation states being right or wrong: the issue should not even be discussed.

Science has a passive attitude to the existing universe. Scientists study the existing, therefore they value it. This may be acceptable for astronomers: there is nothing they can do to change distant planets. At least, not at present. However this passive attitude, here on earth, translates into political conservatism.

The main criticism of science, in recent years, comes from social constructivist theory. These theories say that scientific descriptions of the world are socially constructed. The opponents of these theories say this is absurd. They say, it denies the existence of real objects discovered by science, for instance planets.

That is a discussion for science philosophers. The political problem with science is, that it values the existing. That is an issue of value, not of truth or reality. Sometimes scientists discover something, pfor example a planet, which they later abandon. Errors in instruments, errors in calculations, can lead to false results. However, it is still conservatism to claim value for a planet because of its existence, or non-value because of non-existence. Moral priority of the existing, that is almost a definition of conservatism. In the history of Europe, there are examples of self-proclaimed republics, monarchs, emperors and states. The issue people fought and died for was not if they exist or not. The issue was if they should exist, if their existence is right or wrong.

Science can not avid taking sides, on the political and moral values of the existing. If you say “Study the existing only, know the existing only”, then you are a political conservative already. There is no neutral ground here.

This is why there can be political, anti-Europe, science. In fact there is already anti-Europe science.

This is very visible in the discipline of European Studies. There is no institute in Europe, to study the constitution of a single State of Europa. But you can study the Maastricht Treaty, between nation states, in detail. This is a deliberate political choice, by universities, for a Europe of the Nation States.

All scientists say: “you can not study the non-existent”. There is no state Europa, therefore its constitution is not science, say the academics. Of course, the implication is also: “people who oppose the existing Europe of the Nations, are crazy or stupid”.

A good way to understand academic science, is to compare architecture with architectural history. Architects design buildings, architectural history is a scientific study of existing buildings. Sometimes, architectural historians study plans, of buildings never constructed. However, no architectural historian designs new buildings. (Although they might have a separate practice as an architect). Similarly, art and art history are separate.

Design is possible: science does not make it wrong. In principle, it is even possible to design new planets. Some people do: look on Internet for “terraforming” and you will find examples. But all scientists will say: “that is not science, it is engineering”.

Science, therefore, is inherently conservative. It excludes any activity which changes the existing world. These activities are given separate names: design, engineering, planning. In order to have a pro-Europe science, it would be necessary to create a science which is not conservative, a separate science.

In other words, there is such a thing as European science. European science is science which accepts Europa as valid, even if it does not yet exist.

That means, in order to have European science, it is necessary to destroy the unity of science. This is where the politics start…

Especially in the natural sciences, science already has a universal structure. Destroying this unity is a horror for scientists. In a science like astrophysics, research is done by international teams, in English. The United States, the largest and most advanced economy, provides the most researchers.

These scientists are anti-Europe, but not because of their origins or culture. In fact people from a large state, like China or the US, may have less emotional problems about a single state in Europe. Less than a British scientist, for instance. However, all these scientists support the unity of science, even if they can not use their own language in their work. Scientists are very hostile to cutting scientific contacts. They value universality, communication, and unity in the scientific world.

So, this is the geopolitical situation…There is a group of people, scientists. They are active all over the world. This group has a moral and political belief, in the value of the existing. The group will not change this attitude: they want to keep a distinction between “knowledge” and “design”. Yet, also, they will not allow any separate reform of science. They want science to remain a unit, as global as possible.

In some ways this is similar to the position of the catholic Church in Europe, before the Reformation. It refused to reform, and it would not allow territorially separate churches. In the end, of course, there was a reformation, then war, then territorial separation: cuius regio, eius religio. And then, the Church had to reform itself anyway.

It seems inevitable, that a territorial separation of science is required, in order to reform it. The fastest way to do that, is to cut the links, between science in Europe and the rest of the scientific world. In practice, that means mainly the links with the US and Japan. In turn, the fastest way to cut the links, is to forbid scientific publication in English. Enforcing multilingual research and publication inside Europe, can separate science in Europe. This separation is necessary for its reform. Those who wish to continue the old science, can emigrate.

Science is only universal, in the sense in which the catholic church was universal. As long as everyone was a catholic, then everyone was a catholic. As soon as there was an alternative, the Catholic Church became one church among many. Science is only global science, so long as it is not reformed or separated. There is nothing impossible about a separate European science. All that is necessary is: stop believing in science as a global unit.